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Abstract The objective of this article is to find out how the atrocities in Srebrenica
have been reconstructed by the ICTY by the choice of concepts of criminal
responsibility that reflect the positions, contributions and relative guilt of the par-
ticipants. The concepts of joint criminal enterprise, aiding and abetting and com-
mand responsibility are therefore the guiding notions in the separate sections. These
concepts serve distinct purposes. The joint criminal enterprise doctrine is applied if
several persons share a common plan and make some contribution to implement that
plan. ‘Aiding and abetting’ refers to persons ‘on the fringes’ who ‘merely’ assist in
the commission of crimes, without necessarily sharing the intent of the principals.
And superior responsibility reflects the reality that international crimes proliferate
when military commanders fail to exercise the effective control that fits their
position. However, these are ‘ideal types’ of concepts of criminal responsibility, the
application whereof is inevitably conducive to some distortion of reality. The fact
that criminal law follows its own logic should be taken into account, when one
assesses the case law of the Tribunal in order to obtain an impression of what
‘really’ happened.
Keywords Srebrenica  International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia  War crimes  Genocide  Norm expression  Joint criminal enterprise 
Aiding and abetting  Superior responsibility
& Harmen van der Wilt
H.G.vanderWilt@uva.nl
1 Professor of International Criminal Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
123
Neth Int Law Rev (2015) 62:229–241
DOI 10.1007/s40802-015-0036-8
1 Introduction
The massacre in Srebrenica, which has officially been recognized as genocide,
entailed the commission of countless crimes and the participation of numerous
perpetrators. A small number of them have stood trial before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter: ICTY). The company of
accused in respect of Srebrenica comprised the whole hierarchical gamut, from the
physical perpetrators,1 to the political and military leaders of Serbia and the Bosnian
Serbian republic.2 Obviously, the contributions of the several perpetrators have been
quite diverse and their intentions will have differed as well. The ICTY has for
instance convicted the accused on the basis of persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds as a crime against humanity,3 murder as a violation of the laws
and customs of war4 and forcible transfer.5 Concerning the different modes of
criminal liability, the ICTY has upheld charges of joint criminal enterprise
(hereafter: JCE),6 aiding and abetting7 and command responsibility.8
The aim of this article is to obtain an impression of the way in which the
dynamics and interactions between key players are reflected in the case law of the
ICTY. It does not seek a normative assessment of the different modes of criminal
responsibility in light of basic principles of criminal law.9 The objective is rather to
find out how a dramatic and terrible event is reconstructed in the courtroom by the
choice of concepts of criminal responsibility that reflect the positions, contributions
and relative guilt of the participants. The concepts of JCE, aiding and abetting and
command responsibility are therefore the guiding notions in the separate sections. In
Sect. 2 I will demonstrate that the JCE doctrine has been applied in order to address
the criminal responsibility of those who meticulously plan and organize large
operations, such as the attack in Srebrenica, sometimes long in advance. It serves to
link the political leaders with the military who pass their instructions and orders
down the chain of command which ultimately results in the commission of the
crimes. A problem presents itself here right from the start. While both Karadzˇic´ and
1 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T, T. Ch. I, 29 November 1996;
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-96-22-A, 7 October 1997.
2 As is well known, the trial of Milosevic´ ended with the death of the accused, Prosecutor v. Slobodan
Milosevic´, Order Terminating the Proceedings, Case No. IT-02-54-T, 14 March 2006. The criminal
proceedings against Radovan Karadzˇic´ and Ratko Mladic´ are still in progress.
3 Prosecutor v. Nikolic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60/1, 2 December 2003 and Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber, 8 March 2006.
4 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60, 17 January 2005 and Judgment of the
Appeals Chamber, 9 May 2007.
5 In the case against Borovcˇanin, Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-05-88-T, 10 June
2010.
6 Against Popovic´, Beara, Nikolic´ and Miletic´, see Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al. (supra n. 5).
7 Against Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ (supra n. 4) and in Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, paras. 135–144.
8 Against Pandurevic´, Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-05-
88-A, 30 January 2015 and Prosecutor v. Obrenovic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60/2, 10 December 2003.
9 In previous articles I have been critical of an expansive application of the JCE doctrine, compare Van
der Wilt (2007), pp. 91–108 and Van der Wilt (2009), pp. 158–182.
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Mladic´ have been charged with membership of (several) JCEs, they have not been
convicted. As long as the case is sub judice, scholars should be cautious. I will
therefore take the charges of the Prosecutor as the point of departure, insofar as they
have been provisionally corroborated or at least not denied by the Trial Chamber or
Appeals Chamber.10 Moreover, I will mainly focus on the application of the
doctrine in the case of Popovic´ et al. Sect. 3 explores the assumption that aiding and
abetting, at least in the context of Srebrenica, did not necessarily connote a
secondary and subservient contribution by the accomplice, but also served to
compensate the lesser mens rea. In Sect. 4 I intend to investigate why command
responsibility, while not totally absent, was of slight importance to sustain the
criminal responsibility of the accused. And Sect. 5 ends with some reflections on the
general picture or narrative of Srebrenica that the ICTY has bequeathed to us. That
final section will also briefly indicate whether the ICTY has served as an example
for other international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court
(hereafter: ICC).
2 Srebrenica: A Dismal Crossroads of Multiple Joint Criminal
Enterprises
According to the famous Tadic´ dictum, a JCE entails a plurality of persons that unite
for a common purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of one or more
(international) crimes. Participation need not involve the commission of a specific
crime; a significant contribution to the execution of the common purpose suffices. A
member of the JCE incurs criminal responsibility when he either intended to
perpetrate a certain crime (JCE I), or when the crime, while initially outside the
scope of the common purpose, was foreseeable and the member nevertheless
willingly took that risk (JCE III).11
The prelude to the Srebrenica massacre can probably traced back as far as May
1992 when members of the Bosnian-Serb leadership, including Karadzˇic´ and
Mladic´, the Serbian President Milosevic´ and generals of the Yugoslavian National
Army agreed to permanently remove the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from
Bosnian-Serb claimed territories. As this ‘ethnic cleansing’ involved large-scale
expulsions, the setting up of detention camps and widespread killing in and around
these detention camps, both Karadzˇic´ and Mladic´ are charged with membership of a
JCE that employed the mentioned crimes as a tool to reach their goal. However, this
general policy of forced removal was not directly conducive to the attack on
Srebrenica. After all, General Halilovic´ of the Bosnian Muslim Army and General
10 Defence counsel for Mladic´ started a ‘no case to answer’ procedure, under Rule 98bis of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, seeking the acquittal of his client. However, the Appeals Chamber has
rejected this request, Prosecutor v. Mladic´, Rule 98bis Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-
09-92, 15 April 2014. In respect of Karadzˇic´, the Appeals Chamber reversed his acquittal of genocide in
the ‘Municipalities’ under Rule 98bis, Prosecutor v. Karadzˇic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-5/18-
AR98bis.1, 11 July 2013.
11 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, paras.
227–228. JCE (II)—the so-called ‘concentration camp variety’—is irrelevant in the context of Srebrenica.
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Mladic´ had signed an agreement in the spring of 1993, recognizing Srebrenica as a
safe area that would be under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR).12 It was only in March 1995 that the Army of the Republika Srpska
(VRS) and the Bosnian-Serb Ministry of the Interior (MUP) decided to remove the
entire Muslim population forcibly from Srebrenica, Zˇepa and Gorazˇde. Directive 7
which was issued on 8 March 1995, dispatched to the commanders of the various
Corpses and undersigned by the Supreme Commander Karadzˇic´, bears testimony to
this resolve. It ordered that the Drina Corps was to carry out the ‘complete physical
separation of Srebrenica and Zˇepa as soon as possible, preventing even commu-
nication between individuals in the two enclaves’ and by ‘planned and well thought-
out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope
of further survival or life of the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zˇepa’.13 The Directive
also stated ‘through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits,
reduce and limit the logistics support of the UN protective force, hereinafter
UNPROFOR, to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim
population, making them dependent on our goodwill, while at the same time
avoiding condemnation by the international community and international public
opinion’.14 The obvious intent of the Bosnian Serb Army was to conquer Srebrenica
by strangulation and isolation. The attack on Srebrenica started on 6 July and the
enclave fell to the Bosnian Serbs on 11 July. Whether the genocide was
contemplated at the time of the attack is unclear, but the Trial Chamber in Popovic´
found that the plan to murder Bosnian Muslim men had already materialized on 12
July 1995 and had started being implemented by the separation of the Muslim
men.15
At this juncture, the Trial Chamber interestingly made a distinction between a
JCE to Murder and a JCE to Forcibly Remove Persons from the safe area. The first
JCE to Murder encompassed amongst others Popovic´, Beara and Nikolic´, who all
shared the intent to carry out the common purpose to murder the Bosnian Muslim
men. The Trial Chamber meticulously identified the contributions of each of the
accused. Popovic´ was the ‘lieutenant-colonel who directed the executions that took
place at Orahovac and coordinated logistics for the killings that took place at the
Branjevo Military Farm and the Piluca Cultural Centre on 16 July 1995’. Beara was
‘implicated in identifying locations, securing personnel and equipment, and
overseeing the execution of the murder plan at individual killing sites’. Whereas
Nikolic´ was ‘involved behind the scenes, securing personnel to guard and execute
prisoners as well as giving directions at one of the killing sites’.16
12 Mient Jan Faber, Srebrenica; De genocide die niet werd voorkomen, Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad
(IKV), March 2002, pp. 21–22.
13 Prosecutor v. Mladic´, Rule 98bis Judgment summary in the case of Ratko Mladic´, The Hague 15 April
2014, p. 12.
14 Ibidem, p. 13.
15 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 5, paras. 1051–1052.
16 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 5, paras. 1166–1168 (Popovic´), paras. 1300–1302 (Beara), paras.
1390–1392 (Nikolic´).
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The JCE to Forcibly Remove emerged earlier with the issuance of Directive 7 at
the latest, and consisted mainly of other military officials, amongst them the accused
Miletic´. The Trial Chamber had found that he had made a significant contribution to
the common purpose through his involvement in the drafting of Directives 7 and
7/1, by restricting humanitarian aid and an UNPROFOR re-supply, and through his
role, in the exercise of his functions, in monitoring and coordinating work and
information for the VRS Main Staff.17 However, both the Trial Chamber and the
Appeals Chamber held Miletic´ also responsible under JCE III for ‘opportunistic
killings’ committed by the Bosnian Serb Forces (BSF) in Potocˇari, as these killings
were foreseeable consequences of the JCE to Forcibly Remove and he had taken the
risk that such killings would occur.18
The distinction between the JCE to Murder the Muslim men and the JCE to
Forcibly Remove the women, children and the elderly is sound from the perspective
of the fair attribution of guilt. It suggests that, in the build-up to the massacre, a
certain degree of functional specialization was accomplished within the ranks of the
BSF and MUP. It is plausible that those occupying the highest positions in the
political and military leadership, like Karadzˇic´ and Mladicˇ, were members of the
overarching JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, because the
operation comprised both the killings and the forcible removals. The division of
labour apparently occurred lower down the chain of command.19 A certain degree of
cross-breeding and reciprocal responsibility is reflected in the findings that members
of the JCE to Forcibly Remove—like Miletic´—were also liable for the killings,
because they could have surmised that their activities would further those crimes.
Nonetheless, the representation of the factual situation can only be sketchy and
incomplete. There may have been more intermingling between both JCEs that
simply could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In its ambitions to capture
the collective dimension of international crimes, the JCE doctrine inevitably leaves
many gaps and issues for speculation. This is candidly avowed by the Trial
Chamber in Popovic´, where the Chamber acknowledged that killings had been
committed by persons outside the JCE or by unknown members of the JCE.20 As
long as we do not know who (all) the members of the respective JCEs were, we are
ignorant of their contributions, intentions and interactions. And we are ultimately
left in the dark on the precise nature and composition of the JCEs.
Obviously, legal qualifications are by definition rather coarse and abstract. They
offer a stylized representation of an unruly reality. There is merit in fine-tuning the
legal instruments to the facts and in this respect the ICTY did a great job in the
Popovic´ case. However, while there is clear evidence to show that there was a
certain division of labour within the ranks of the Bosnian Serb Army, one should be
careful not to conclude that the functions were strictly separated.
17 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 5, para. 1606.
18 Ibidem, paras. 1734–1735.
19 The Trial Chamber found that neither Popovic´ (para. 1174), nor Beara (para. 1309), nor Nikolic´ (para.
1395) had been a member of the JCE to Forcibly Remove.
20 Popovic´ et al., supra n. 5, para. 1174.
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3 Assisting the Ethnic Cleansing in Srebrenica
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute stipulates that a person who ‘[…] aids and abets in
the planning, perpetration or execution of a crime [under the jurisdiction of the
ICTY] shall be individually responsible for that crime’. The actus reus of aiding and
abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement,
or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.21
According to the Trial Chamber in the Furundzˇija case, the accomplice need not
share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of a positive intention to commit
the crime. It suffices that the accomplice knows that his actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.22 In the Perisic´ case the Appeals
Chamber defined aiding and abetting more narrowly by adding the element of
‘specific direction’ to the actus reus. Following the Tadic´ Appeal Judgment, the
Appeals Chamber found that the assistance provided must be ‘specifically’—rather
than ‘in some way’—directed towards relevant crimes.23 The Chamber thus forged
a closer link between the assistance and the crimes and heightened the threshold for
criminal responsibility. While Perisˇic´, as Chief of Staff of the army of Yugoslavia
(VJ), had indeed rendered assistance to the VRS—a separate military entity—, he
had been remote from the actions of the principal perpetrators and his activities
could have been directed towards sustaining the VRS’ general war effort, rather
than having specifically facilitated the VRS crimes in Srebrenica.24 The Appeals
Chamber of the Sierra Leone Court in the Taylor case rejected the ‘specific
direction’ approach of the Perisˇic´ Appeals Chamber.25 And the Appeals Chamber in
Sainovic´ sided with Taylor and explicitly distanced itself from Perisˇic´, leaving the
issue somewhat in abeyance.26
Whatever the final outcome in the ‘specific direction’ debate may be, it is certain
that ‘aiding and abetting’ connotes a more secondary form of criminal participation.
In the context of Srebrenica, this was particularly corroborated in the trial of
Blagojevic´ and Jokic´, the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade of the Bosnian Serb
Army and the Chief of Engineering of the VRS Zvornik Brigade, respectively.27
The Bratunac Brigade had been involved in separating the population, loading and
escorting the buses and patrolling the area around which the population was held
until the transfer was complete. Jokic´ had been instructed to deliver heavy
machinery that was used to dig mass graves. The Trial Chamber was convinced
21 Prosecutor v. Furundzˇija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998, paras. 234–235.
22 Prosecutor v. Furundzˇja, supra n. 21, para. 245.
23 Prosecutor v. Perisˇic´, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 28 February 2013,
paras. 27 and 39.
24 Prosecutor v. Perisˇic´, supra n. 23, para. 61.
25 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September
2013, para. 481.
26 Prosecutor v. Sˇainovic´ et al., Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, para. 1650:
‘Consequently, the Appeals Chamber […] unequivocally rejects the approach adopted in the Perisˇic´
Appeal Judgment as it is in direct and material conflict with the prevailing jurisprudence on the actus reus
of aiding and abetting liability and with customary international law in this regard’.
27 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60, 17 January 2005.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Jokic´ was aware of this purpose. Neither Blagojevic´,
nor Jokic´, nor their subordinates had personally been involved in the killings or the
forcible transfers. Nonetheless, their contributions had a substantial effect on the
commission of the crimes and Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ had known that they assisted the
forcible transfer or the killings. Moreover, Blagojevic´ was initially even convicted
of ‘aiding and abetting genocide’. However, this verdict was reversed on Appeal.28
The Appeals Chamber considered that from Blagojevic´’ mere knowledge of the
forcible transfer—which did not in and of itself constitute a genocidal act—his
awareness of the principal perpetrators’ genocidal intent could not be inferred.29
The Trial Chamber confirmed that Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ were not key players in
the human drama of Srebrenica.30 However, this does not imply that those imputed
with ‘complicity’ in Srebrenica were only minor figures, acting on the fringes of the
massacre. An excellent example of the contrary is General Radislav Krstic´,
Commander of the Drina Corps, whose assistance was sought by Mladic´ and
Karadzˇic´ for the conquest of the Srebrenica enclave. Initially, Krstic´ had been
convicted, as a member of a JCE, of genocide, persecution, inhumane acts (forcible
transfer), extermination and murder, because he had been involved, as the high
commander, in both the forcible transfers and the killings.31 It was questionable,
however, whether Krstic´ shared the genocidal intent of his co-perpetrators in the
JCE, as the Trial Chamber itself seemed to admit. The Trial Chamber characterized
Krstic´ as a ‘reserved and serious career officer who is unlikely to have ever
instigated a plan such as the one devised for mass execution of Bosnian Muslim
men, following the take-over of Srebrenica in July 1995’, adding that ‘left to his
own devices, it seems doubtful that Krstic´ would have been associated with such a
plan at all’.32 Krstic´ had been aware of the genocidal intent of some of the members
of the VRS Main Staff and, although he did not support the plan, he had allowed the
Main Staff to employ the resources of the Drina Corps which were indispensable for
the implementation of the plan. According to the Appeals Chamber, his criminal
responsibility was ‘therefore more properly expressed as that of an aider and abettor
to genocide, and not as that of a perpetrator’.33 Engaging in a discussion on the
proper relationship between ‘complicity’ under Article 4(3) of the Genocide
Convention and ‘aiding and abetting’ in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, the
Appeals Chamber found the former to be the wider concept, ‘because the terms
‘‘complicity’’ and ‘‘accomplice’’ may encompass conduct broader than that of
aiding and abetting’.34 For aiding and abetting knowledge of the principal
perpetrator’s specific genocidal intent would suffice, whereas, ‘by contrast, there is
authority to suggest that complicity in genocide, where it prohibits conduct broader
28 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-02-60, 9 May 2007.
29 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, supra n. 28, para. 123.
30 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´ & Jokic´, supra n. 27, paras. 835–836.
31 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 653.
32 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, supra n. 31, para. 420.
33 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para.
137.
34 Prosecutor v. Krstic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra n. 33, para. 139.
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than aiding and abetting, requires proof that the accomplice had the specific intent
to destroy a protected group’.35 The qualification of Krstic´ as an aider and abettor of
genocide had implications for the charges of murder as a war crime and
extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity. Logic dictated that in
respect of these crimes which were different legal qualifications of the same facts he
also incurred criminal responsibility as an aider and abettor. Krstic´’s conviction on
the basis of his membership of a JCE was only confirmed in respect of the forcible
transfer and the ensuing ‘opportunistic crimes’ that were committed at Potocˇari and
that had been foreseeable and natural consequences of the forcible transfer.36
In view of their rather divergent positions and contributions, it is remarkable that
both Blagojevic´/Jokic´ and Krstic´ incurred criminal responsibility as aiders and
abettors. Apparently, the Appeals Chamber cherished the opinion that the secondary
significance of an aider and abettor could exclusively reside in his lower level of
mens rea. That seems to be corroborated in the Chamber’s finding that other
accomplices would necessarily require the specific intent to destroy a group,
although the Chamber did not further explain which accomplices it had in mind.
One would be inclined to think of instigators or inducers, whose position is
characterized by their taking the initiative in the crime. At the end of the day, the
considerable difference in contribution (actus reus) was reflected in the prison
sentence: whereas Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ were sentenced to respectively 18 and
9 years imprisonment, Krstic´ received 35 years imprisonment.37 This refinement at
the sentencing stage does not alter the fact that the equal qualification of these
dissimilar actors in the Srebrenica tragedy is somewhat counter-intuitive.
4 Superior Responsibility at Srebrenica: A Rare Phenomenon
A (military or civilian) superior will incur criminal responsibility if he knew or had
reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit international crimes or
had done so and he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof (Article 7(3) ICTY Statute). The
doctrine of superior responsibility which is rooted in the time-honoured notion of
military command has been elaborated by the Trial Chamber in Delalic´ and Others
(the so-called ‘Cˇelibic´i case’).38 The first element of the doctrine—a superior-
subordinate relationship—implies the effective control of the superior over persons
committing the underlying international crimes, in the sense of having the material
ability to prevent and punish the commission of those crimes. Such control can be
predicated on a de jure position as a commander, but can also derive from the
possession of de facto powers of control.39 Secondly, the Trial Chamber emphasized
35 Prosecutor v. Krstic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra n. 33, para. 142 (emphasis added).
36 Prosecutor v. Krstic´ (Appeals Chamber), supra n. 33, para. 144.
37 Krstic´’s initial sentence of 40 years imprisonment by the Trial Chamber was reduced by 5 years by the
Appeals Chamber.
38 Prosecutor v. Delalic´ and Others, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998.
39 Prosecutor v. Delalic´, supra n. 38, para. 370 and para. 378.
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that the mens rea standard of ‘had reason to know’ was stricter than the purely
normative notion of ‘should have known’, which entails an obligation to keep
abreast at all times. It implied the presence and availability to the superior of some
specific information which would provide notice of offences committed by his
subordinates.
That information need not be such that it by itself was sufficient to compel the
conclusion of the existence of such crimes. It is sufficient that the superior was
put on further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated
the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences
were being committed or about to be committed by his subordinates.40
And finally the Trial Chamber held that the duty to take ‘necessary and
reasonable measures’ would pertain to the measures within the material possibility
of the superior.41
The concept of superior responsibility has only be rarely applied to sustain the
criminal responsibility of the accused who stood trial for their criminal involvement
in the Srebrenica massacre, but when it was applied, it yielded interesting legal
findings. Pandurevic´, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, had been convicted of
murder as a crime against humanity and as a violation of the laws and customs of
war for failing to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent his
subordinates from committing crimes. However, Pandurevic´ had been physically
absent from 4 to 15 July 1995 and he had only been apprised of the criminal acts of
his subordinates when he returned to the Zvornik Brigade on 15 July 1995.
Meanwhile, his deputy—Obrenovic´—was running the affairs and this man had not
informed him of the crimes. Pandurevic´ censured the Trial Chamber for applying an
unduly formalistic standard, but the Appeals Chamber approved the Chamber’s
verdict, holding that Pandurevic´ maintained the ability to exercise control over both
his deputy and the rest of the Zvornik Brigade during his period of absence.42 Even
Pandurevic´’s claim that his command authority over the Zvornik Brigade had been
interrupted—and in fact superseded by Beara and Popovic´ who had been directing
orders from Mladic´ to his subordinates, did not obtain a hearing from the Appeals
Chamber. The Chamber recalled that the exercise of effective control by one
commander does not necessarily exclude effective control by a different commander
and that Pandurevic´ was legally obliged to ensure that international humanitarian
law was applied even when faced with manifestly unlawful orders issued by his
superiors.43 The Appeals Chamber addressed the situation of parallel command and
made it perfectly clear that a commander remained responsible, even if he had
‘delegated’ his authority to his immediate subordinate or was confronted by orders
of his superiors. The second interesting element in the findings of the Appeals
Chamber in the case of Pandurevic´ concerned the scope of the commander’s duty to
punish his subordinates for international crimes. The Appeals Chamber recalled that
40 Prosecutor v. Delalic´, supra n. 38, para. 393.
41 Prosecutor v. Delalic´, supra n. 38, para. 395.
42 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 8, para. 1878.
43 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 8, para. 1897.
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a superior’s duty to punish the perpetrators of a crime, absent his own powers to
sanction them, could entail an alternative obligation to report them to the competent
authorities, which would only fulfil the duty to punish if such a report is likely to
trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings. As
Pandurevic´ had not informed the Military Prosecutor, nor his higher ranking
officer, Krstic´, nor the MUP, he had failed to discharge his duty as a commander and
therefore was convicted on the basis of command responsibility.44
Pandurevic´’s second in command, Dragan Obrenovic´, had been Acting
Commander of the Zvornik Brigade during the former’s absence and was Deputy
Commander and Chief of Staff after Pandurevic´ had returned. He had entered a
guilty plea and showed remorse for his contribution in the killing of Muslim
prisoners. Whereas Obrenovic´ was convicted under both individual responsibility,
under Article 7(1) Statute, and superior responsibility (Article7(3) Statute), the Trial
Chamber found that his liability primarily derived from his responsibilities as a
commander.45 He had released seven of his soldiers to prepare for the arrival of the
Muslim prisoners and only two of his men had participated in the burial of
prisoners, but he knew or had reason to know that several units of the Zvornik
Brigade had participated in the guarding, executing and burying of Muslim
prisoners. The Trial Chamber touched on the gist of the doctrine of superior
responsibility, by holding that ‘the central part of Dragan Obrenovic’s responsibility
arises from his failure to act in the face of the commission of the crime of
persecutions—by being passive when he should have prevented his subordinates
from committing the criminal acts or punished them for such crimes afterwards’.46
While the Trial Chambers in the cases against Pandurevic´ and Obrenovic´
captured the essence of superior responsibility, Krstic´ did not incur criminal
responsibility on the basis of command responsibility. The Trial Chamber
acknowledged that General Krstic´ satisfied the three-pronged test for the partic-
ipation of the members of the Drina Corps in the killings.47 Krstic´ knew about the
killings and wielded effective control that would have enabled him to prevent Drina
Corps officers and soldiers from participating in the commission of the crimes. Not
only did he fail to prevent those crimes, he did not punish a single officer or soldier,
nor did he report the grave violation of international humanitarian law to the civil
authorities. Krstic´ advanced a fear for the safety of himself and his family as the
reason why he had been passive, but the Trial Chamber did not find this to be
credible. The fact that he had been publicly extolled by Mladic´ and Karadzˇic´ for his
courageous role in the conquest of the enclave and that he had supported Mladic´’s
position as Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS ‘demonstrated Krstic´
solidarity with, rather than his fear of, the highest military and civilian echelons of
the Republika Serpska’.48 However, the Trial Chamber did not convict Krstic´ on the
44 Prosecutor v. Popovic´ et al., supra n. 8, paras. 1932–1944.
45 Prosecutor v. Obrenovic´, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, 10 December 2003, para. 88.
46 Ibidem.
47 Prosecutor v. Krstic´ (Judgment of Trial Chamber), para. 648.
48 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, supra n. 31, para. 651.
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basis of superior responsibility, because his responsibility was sufficiently reflected
in his individual responsibility as an aider and abettor.49
The judgment of the Trial Chamber in the Krstic´ case shows that, in the case of
concurrence between individual and superior responsibility, courts are inclined to
give preference to the former, presumably because it connotes a more direct
involvement in the crime(s). While it is debatable whether Krstic´’s responsibility is
most aptly captured under the heading of ‘aiding and abetting’ or ‘command
responsibility’, it is irrefutable that the extent and relevance of the latter is obscured
by the prevalence of the former. It is another example of how legal concepts can
distort reality.
5 The Legal Representation of the Srebrenica Massacre: Some Final
Reflections
It has been the purpose of this article to explore how the massacre at Srebrenica has
been represented in the case law of the ICTY. Undoubtedly, the Tribunal left us with
a very rich and detailed account of the tragic events, with numerous cross-references
between the cases. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to assess to what extent this
comprehensive case law accurately reflects reality. This is intrinsic to the
application of (criminal) law. By its very nature, criminal law enforcement is
selective. It simply cannot deal with all incidents and put all perpetrators to trial.
What I have tried to demonstrate in this article, though, is that some of the
distortions of reality can be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of the concepts of
individual criminal responsibility. The Tribunal has used several tools in order to
capture the different positions and contributions of the accused within the wholesale
cataclysm. These concepts serve distinct purposes. The JCE doctrine is applied if
several persons share a common plan and make some contribution to implement that
plan. It reflects both the organizational and collective dimension of system
criminality. ‘Aiding and abetting’ refers to persons ‘on the fringes’ who ‘merely’
assist the commission of crimes, without necessarily sharing the intent of the
principals. And superior responsibility reflects the reality that war crimes and other
very serious international crimes proliferate when military commanders, though
perhaps not intending these crimes themselves, turn a blind eye or otherwise fail to
exercise the effective control that comes with their position within the military
hierarchy.
However, these ‘ideal types’ of concepts of criminal responsibility may suggest
too much or may not always correspond with the way they are applied in practice.
A JCE in legal terms only implies that some persons have a common purpose, which
entails the commission of one or more crimes and that they employ some activities
to realize that purpose. It does not explain what the contributions of all the members
have been and how they have interacted, because not all the members of the JCE
have been brought to trial and the exact composition and scope of the enterprise
therefore remains unknown. In the context of Srebrenica the ICTY concluded that
49 Prosecutor v. Krstic´, supra n. 31, para. 652.
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(at least) two JCEs co-existed, one planning to forcibly remove the women, children
and the elderly from the enclave and one that had been established for the purpose
of killing the male Muslims. From the perspective of the fair attribution of guilt, this
separation made perfect sense. A literal reading of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ would
however suggest that both these groups had a more or less fixed composition and
clear-cut intentions. The ICTY has candidly avowed that ‘unknown members’ had
committed ‘opportunistic crimes’, outside the purview of the (original) criminal
purpose, suggesting that both the composition and the ‘plans’ of a JCE may have
been far more fluid and uncertain than one would be inclined to assume. It serves as
a good admonition not to take the simplified and reductionist reality of legal
concepts at face value.
The concept of aiding and abetting produces other problems in the realm of
distorting reality. An aider and abettor differs from a principal in respect of his actus
reus and/or his mens rea, which implies that these distinguishing features need not
be cumulative. The legal assessment of perpetrators’ criminal responsibility in
Srebrenica has demonstrated that a key player like General Krstic´ and compara-
tively minor figures like Blagojevic´ and Jokic´ could all qualify as aiders and
abettors, either because they lack the requisite mens rea (Krstic´), or because they
render a subsidiary contribution to the crimes (Blagojevic´ and Jokic´). The mens rea
and actus reus serve as communicating vessels. Aiding and abetting as a legal
category diminishes in explanatory power if such divergent dramatis personae can
be brought under its heading.
One might have expected that superior responsibility would have abounded in the
case law of the ICTY to sustain the conviction of military commanders. After all,
Srebrenica collapsed after an attack by a regular army, organized along modern
command structures. However, there have only been few convictions on the basis of
this doctrine. Several explanations have been advanced for this remarkable paucity.
The Trial Chamber in theKrstic´ case indicated that aiding and abetting better reflected
the involvement and culpability of the accused. It has been suggested that command
responsibility after the lapse of time has become almost impossible to prove.50 One
perhaps less obvious reason may be that the light requirements in respect of the mens
rea of superior responsibility—‘had reason to know’ does not imply concrete
knowledge and certainly not ‘intent’, are hard to reconcile with the demanding
‘specific intent to destroy a group’ of genocide. It is remarkable that all convictions of
Srebrenica participants on account of superior responsibility have been entered in
connection with war crimes or crimes against humanity, i.e., not genocide. But even in
the case of crimes against humanity international criminal tribunals might be reluctant
to combine such highly serious crimes with an omission, connoting a lack of
supervision and a dereliction of duties, rather than vile intent.51
50 Compare the speech of former President Izetbekovic´ during the ICTY Legacy Conference: ‘20 Years
of the ICTY; Anniversary Events and Legacy Conference Proceedings’, publication of the ICTY
Outreach Programme, 2014, p. 25.
51 In a similar vein Mettraux (2009), pp. 226–228. See also Schabas (2009), pp. 364–366. Superior
responsibility has been applied in combination with genocide in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,
Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May, paras. 551–571. Zahar and Sluiter (2008), p. 270 qualify the
juxtaposition of individual responsibility and command responsibility in this case as ‘almost absurd’.
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Other international criminal tribunals and the ICC have similarly wrestled with
the question of which concepts of criminal responsibility should be employed in
order to capture the involvement of the accused that had been brought before them.
The Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone held Liberia’s former
President Charles Taylor responsible for aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes
against humanity, a verdict that was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber.52 The
judgment has provoked a similar surprise and indignation as the Krstic´ case. The
ICC has largely rejected the JCE doctrine and has opted for co-perpetration and
indirect perpetration by means of control over a person or an organization.53
Although these novel efforts have not been spared from criticism, the ‘control
theory’ has been praised as well for its fair labelling qualities.54 The ICTY has
served as an example for other international tribunals and the ICC, either inviting
them to follow suit, or prompting them to break new ground. In that sense we can
conclude that the ICTY in general and the judgments in respect of Srebrenica in
particular have left a certain legacy.
The three examples that have been discussed in this article serve to demonstrate
that one should be cautious in interpreting the use of legal concepts as a direct
reflection of reality. It is to my mind an important mission of international criminal
tribunals to faithfully reconstruct what has happened. If we take the limitations of
the courtroom into account, the ICTY has accomplished this task in respect of the
carnage in Srebrenica. However, criminal law follows its own logic and one should
take this to heart when assessing the case law of the Tribunal.
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